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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff - Respondent, ) 
I ) 
vs. ) Case No. 
) 
ISADORE BLEA, ) 10754 
) 
Defendant -Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BLEA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the criminal 
conviction of Appellant Isadore Blea on a 
charge of "willfully and unlawfully obtaining 
a narcotic drug, to-wit: Deodorized Tincture 
of Opium by the use of a false name, to-wit: 
Frank Revera ..• " in violation of Section 
58-13a-35, Utah Code Anno~ated, 1953. 
-2-
DISPOSITION OF 'l'HE CASE BY LO\\TER COURT 
The Appellant was tried by a jury on 
August 15, 1966, before the Honorable Leonard 
W. Elton. After having been found guilty by 
jury verdict, he was sentenced to be confined 
at the Utah State Prison for a term not to 
exceed five (5) years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Blea seeks reversal and rema~ 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 5th day of December, 
1965, an individual using the name of Frank 
Revera (Tr. 17) entered the office of Dr. 
Maitland Spencer, complaining that he and his 
family were suffering from diarrhea and were 
in need of medication (Tr. 24, 26). Based 
upon that complaint, and Dr. Spencer's medical 
judgment, he issued a prescription for treat-
ment of the described malady. The medication 
prescribed was Deodorized Tincture of Opium 
(Tr. 26). 
There is no testimony or evidence that 
the Appellant --- or that individual using 
the name of Frank Revera --- requested that 
Dr. Spencer give any special type of medica-
tion or that the Appellant knew or had any 
reason to know the character of the medicati~ 
pr~scribed. Likewise, there is no testimony 
that Dr. Spencer relied on the allegedly 
false name as an inducement for issuing the 
prescription, nor is there evidence that the 
name Frank Revera was a f alsc name or that 
Isadore Blea is the Appellant's true name. 
(See Tr. 24 - 33). 
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At the conclusion of the trial the 
Court, in its Instruction Number 8 (R: 9) to 
the jury, stated the specific elements of 
the crime charged. Neither Instruction 
Number 8 nor any other instruction made any 
reference to knowledge or intent, or reliance 
on the false name by the doctor as elements 
which the jury must affirmatively find before 
bringing in verdict of guilty, nor was there 
any definitive instruction as to the require-
ment for intent except indirectly and colla-
terally in a restatement of Section 76-1-20, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, contained in 
Instruction Number 9, which provided merely 
that 11 •• • • in every crime or public offense 
there must be a union or joint operation of 
the act and intent. 11 (R. 10) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT ON THE ELEMENT OF 
KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT, AND ON THE 
NECESSITY FOR A FINDING OF RELIANCE 
BY THE DOCTOR ON THE USE OF A FALSE 
NAME. 
The Appellant on this appeal asserts 
the following matters: That the Court wa$ 
required as a matter of law to instruct the 
jury that scienter or knowledge, and ~nten~ 
are essential elements of the crime of 
obtaining a narcotic drug by the use of a 
false name; that the failure to so instruct 
was prejudicial to the defendant in light of 
the evidence and testimony before the jury, 
since it is eminently clear from the evidence 
Lhctl the jury, if properly instructed, could, 
and probably would, have found that the 
App,:'1 Lrn t did not know what Dr. Spencer was 
-4-
prescribing for him, that he did not intend 
to obtain a narcotic drug by the use of a 
false name, that the use of a false name 
was not an inducement for any course of 
action which Dr. Spencer undertood; that 
there is no evidence supportive of the jury's 
verdict that a false name was used; and that, 
finally, the failure of Appellant's counsel 
at trial to take exceptions to the instructions, 
or to raise the issue of the omitted elements 
by way of objection does not preclude the 
Appellant from raising the matter on this 
appeal. 
(a) Knowledge and intent, and 
reliance on the use of a false 
name are essential elements of 
the crime of obtaining a narcotic 
drug by use of a false name, and 
as sue~ the Court must instruct 
the jury with reTerence to the 
same. 
Elemental in the tradition of the common 
law of crimes is the requirement that before 
a crime exists there must be a union or 
coalition of actus reas and mens rea. That 
is, the act alone is not enough to constitute 
a crime but must be accompanied by a mental 
element variously described as intent, or 
scienter or knowledge. This historical common 
law principle has been recognized in general 
terms by the Legislature of this state when 
it provided in Section 76-1-20, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, that "in every crime or 
public offense there must exist the union 
or joint operation of act and intent . " 
While the substantive elements of a crime 
may be described in different terms depending 
-5-
on the nature of that crime, every crime, 
except for certain purely regulatory offenses, 
may be described in general terms as consisting 
of a proscribed act accompanied by a necessary 
mentality. 
In the matter presently before the 
Court, the Appellant was charged with the 
criminal violation of Section 58-13a-35, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
that "no person shall obtain or attempt to 
obtain a narcotic drug • . . by the use of 
a false name. • • " In its instructions to 
the jury, the Court, in Instruction Number 8, 
stated that "if the evidence establishes 
each and all of the essential elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
is your duty to find the defendant guilty." 
(R. 9) The elements which the Court stated 
were required were only the following: 
"(l) That on or about the 15th 
day of December, 1965, that said 
defendant obtained a narcotic drug 
known as Deodorized Tincture of 
Opium. 
(2) That Deodorized Tincture 
of Opium is a narcotic drug within 
the meaning of the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
(3) That said defendant obtained 
said narcotic drug by the use of a 
false name. 
(4) That the acts took place 
within the confines of Salt Lake 
county, State of Utah." (R. 9) 
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There is no statement in that ~pecif ic and 
limited summary of the elements as to the 
mental element of the crime charged. There 
is no statement that the jury must find as 
an essential element of the crime charged 
that the Appellant intended to obtain a 
narcotic drug by the use of a false name 
or that he had knowledge of the character 
of the drug that he allegedly obtained by 
the use of a false· name. There is no state-
ment that the jury must find that the use 
of a false name induced the procurement of 
a narcotic drug. 
The only reference to intent to be 
found at any point in the instructions is 
the broad and general statement by the Court 
in Instruction Number 9 quoted from Section 
76-1-20 as noted above, and this without 
any further statement on the part of the 
Court which might have aided the jury in 
knowing what to do with the fact that "every 
crime or public offense requires a union or 
joint operation of the act and intent". 
Thus, the Court totally failed to give the 
jury any guidance with reference to mens 
rea as an essential element of the crime 
charged. 
The cases which have involved sections 
of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the pro-
visions of which Utah has adopted, and under 
which the Appellant was charged and convicted, 
have uniformly held that there is a requirement 
of knowledge and/or intent before there is a 
violation of the act. State vs. Winters, 
16 Utah 2d 13 9, 3 9 6 Pa. -2d--1r1-2-TI9 6 4) . People 
vs. King, 34 Ill. 2d 199, 215 N.E. 2d 22~ 
-7-
(1966); State vs. Ballestros, 100 Ariz. 262, 
413 P. 2d 739 (1966); Beasley vs. State, 158 
Fla. 824, 30 So. 2d 379 (1947); State vs. 
Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24, (1955). 
Thus, in State vs. Winters, supra., 
which involved unlawful possession, the Court 
stated at 142, 16 Utah 2d that: 
"In a prosecution for unlawful 
possession of narcotics, the people 
must prove that the accused exercised 
dominion and control over the drug 
with knowledge of its presence and 
narcotic character." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In Beasley vs. State, supra., in which 
defendant was charged with obtaining narcotics 
under forged prescriptions, the Florida Court 
stated that: 
"Generally, it must be alleged 
and shown that (a) the instrument 
was forged; (b) that the defendant 
knew that the instrument was false 
and forged; and (c) that it was 
uttered with an intent to injury or 
defraud another. " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In the case of People vs. Martin, 172 
P. 2d 910 (Cal. 1946) the Court stated at 911: 
"From the several decisions 
long followed (citations) the 
Supreme Court has recently derived 
the rule that the jury must be 
convinced that one accused of 
-8-
possessing a narcotic found in a 
cache on his premises or within 
reach of his habitation must have 
knowledge of the presence of such 
narcotic and -tha-tsuch knowledge 
is the essence of the crime of 
possession under the narcotic 
act." (Emphasis supplied) 
Dy analogy,· the same requirement pertain 
for the crime of obtaining by the use of a 
false name. Stated another way, the jury must 
be convinced that one accused of obtaining a 
narcotic by the use of a false name had know-
ledge of the nature of the medication he was 
obtaining and that such knowledge is the 
essence of the crime of obtaining. 
In People vs. King, supra., involving 
the sale of narcotic drugs, the Illinois Court 
said that it knew of " . no case sustaining 
a conviction for the unlawful sale of narcotic: 
r.d thou t the presence_ of intent. " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In People vs. Gory, 170 P. 2d 433 
(Cal. 1946), a case involving the illegal 
possession of narcotic drugs, the California 
Court discussed the relationship between the 
act of possession and the accompanying mental 
element. In reversing the conviction, the 
Court stated at 436 that: 
"A person has 'possession' of a 
chattel who has physical control 
with the intent to exercise such 
control, or having had such physical 
control, has not abandoned it and no 
other person has attained possession 
. but knowledge of the existence 
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of the object is essential to 
'physical control thereof with the 
intent to exercise such control'. 
And such knowledge must necessarily 
precede the intent to exercise, or 
the exercise of, such control ••• 
[I]nstruction 12, as above 
quoted in its predication of a 
finding of guilt upon the defendant's 
knowingly having in his possession 
the objects charged in the informa-
tion should have been given to the 
jury. The word 'knowingly' imparts 
knowledge that the facts exist which 
bring the act or omission within the 
provisions of this code. It does not 
require any knowledge of the unlawful-
ness of such act or omission. Thus, 
Instruction 12 invoked the element 
of knowledge in the sense of the 
defendant's awareness of the presence 
of the marijuana in the box given him 
for the storage of his personal effect 
at the prison farm and so presented 
to the jury an issue of fact deter-
minative of defendant's guilt or 
innocence of possession prohibited 
by the statute." (Emphasis is the 
Court's) 
The foregoing cases deal with the 
element of knowledge as related to unlawful 
possession. When dealing with unlawful 
obtaining, it is patent that the word 
"obtaining" contains an element additional 
to the "awareness of presence" implicit in 
the word "possession". Webster's New 
Collr''Jlc:i.te Dictionary, 1960 Edition, states 
-E11a-C ohL1in means to "get hold of by effort". 
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Thus "obtaining" carries with it the concept 
of more purposeful action than that conveyed 
by merely having or possessing, and "obtaining", 
unlike "possessing", includes more than just 
an awareness of the presence or existence of 
the object; it asserts a kno__1_~1=-~dg_e of the 
character of the object and an intention to 
obtain an-object of that character. 
In State vs'. \\/inters, supra., this Court 
expressly recognized that knowledge of the 
narcotic character of the drug possessed was 
an essential clement of possesslon, and if 
knowledge of the narcotic character of the 
drug is required for the commission of the 
crime of possession, then as a minimum, it 
must necessarily be required for the commission 
of the crime of obtaining. 
The evidence in this case affirmatively 
snpports the proposition, which proposition 
._'ic? _jury could have found below if properly 
i,!st.ructed, that the Appellant had no aware-
ness of the presence of the narcotic drug, 
had no knowledge of the narcotic character 
of the drug which he was obtaining, and had 
no intent to obtain a drug of a narcotic 
character. 
While the Appellant has been unable 
to find any cases discussing per se the 
required mental element involved in the 
unlawful obtaining of a narcotic drug by 
the use of false name, an examination of 
the facts of this case indicates why know-
ledge and intent should be required as 
~lements of this violation to the same degree 
as they have been required for similar 
violations as noted above. The testimony 
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of Dr. Spencer is eminently clear that the 
Appellant entered the doctor's office with 
the complaint of a common malady, that the 
Appellant had asked the doctor what he and 
his family might take as a cure for the 
malady, and that the doctor gave him a pres-
cription for Deodorized Tincture of Opium 
(Tr. 24, 26). There is absolutely no evidence 
or testimony that the Appellant asked for any 
particular medication, that he asked specifi-
cally for Deodorized Tincture of Opium or 
that he knew or had any reason to know the 
character of the medication which the doctor 
prescribed for the malady. 
Additionally, the proscription of the 
act of obtaining a narcotic drug by the use 
of false name makes little sense unless the 
use of the false name is an inducement in 
the procurement of the drug. There is no 
evidence that the use of the name Frank 
Revera induced Dr. Spencer to give this 
particular person the particular drug 
involved here. As a matter of general law, 
the use of a false name is not in and of 
itself a criminal or civil violation, and 
it is only when the name is used with the 
intention of inducing another to do some-
thing that he would not do but for the use 
of the false name that sanctions are imposed. 
Thus, in State vs. Powell, 321 P. 2d 333 
(Ore. 1958), involving an unlawful attempt 
to obtain a narcotic drug by the use of a 
false name and involving facts substantially 
similar to the present matter, wherein the 
defendant presented herself to the office 
of the doctor complainin~ of severe pain in 
the abdc:" 1inal area and wherein the doctor 
t-h(c'n pi, , r:ribed a narcotic drug 1 the Oregon 
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Court, interpreting the same provision as is 
involved here, stated at 338, 321 P. 2d: 
"The evidence in this case dis-
closes that the doctor in prescribing 
the narcotic to the defendant on the 
20th and 23rd of July put no reliance 
in the name or aJdress of the 
defendant whatsoever, but relied 
solely upon' the defendant's repre-
sentations of her physical condition 
and his own examination of her 
physical condition. When she returned 
on the 25th of July, the doctor did 
not refuse her prescription because 
of her name or address, but because 
he had already prescribed more than 
was proper or necessary in the treat-
ment of her condition. In other 
words, the defendant as a person and 
not because of name or address 
received the very narcotics intended 
by the doctor. Thus, the false name 
or address was immaterial. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
There is no evidence in this 
case that the defendant attempted 
to or did receive narcotics because 
of her use of a false name or 
address. The most that can be said 
is that she attempted to conceal the 
fact of her addiction." 
The Court preceded the above statement 
by the following interpretation of the Oregon 
provision of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act at 
337: 
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"The distinction to be drawn 
between ORS 474.170, which makes it 
a felony to obtain a narcotic by the 
use of a false name or the giving of 
a false address, and ORS 475.060, a 
misdemeanor to use a false name or 
give a false address, in obtaining 
treatment in which narcotic drugs 
are prescribed or dispensed, lies 
in the use of the words of the felony 
statute 'to obtain a narcotic by the 
use of'. These words must be con-
strued as meaning 'by means of'; 
that is, the using of the false name 
by an accused is a factor in obtaining 
or attempting to obtain the drug. " 
See also Wright vs. State, 325 P. 2d 1089 
(1958). 
It follows then, before one has violated 
Section 58-13a-35, that he must have intended 
by use of the false name to induce another to 
give him narcotics, that he must have known · 
the character of the drug being obtained, 
and that, as a matter of fact the false name 
served as an inducement in the procurement 
of the narcotic drug. Without such a require-
ment, it would be possible, by the innocent 
use of a nick-name, to subject one's self to 
a criminal penalty of five years imprisonment. 
The State's evidence fails absolutely in 
showing that the use of the false name was 
an inctucement for Dr. Spencer's action or 
that the Appellant knew or had any reason 
to know, by going to Dr. Spencer and stating 
that he had diarrhea and needed medication 
that tho doctor would prescribe a narcotic 
<1 r11g. The question arises, of course, why 
J false name, if any, was used. The answer, 
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while irrelevant to any issue involved here, 
lies in any number of reasons, one of which 
may well have been a desire to avoid a charge 
from the doctor for his services which, while 
reprehensible in and of itself, does not 
constitute a mental element sufficient for 
a finding that appellant committed the crime 
of obtaining narcotics by use of a false name. 
Another, and more subtle reason very well may 
have been that a false name was not used at 
all and that the Appellant is a victim of 
mistaken identity (Tr. 29, 38, 46, 47-48). 
In light of the foregoing, the Appellant 
submits that the failure of the trial court 
to instruct on the element of mens rea was 
error which, as shown hereinafter, was pre-
judicial to the rights of the Appellant. 
(b) Failure to instruct on the 
required mental element con-
stitutes prejudicial error 
which forms the basis for 
reversal and remand for new 
trial. 
While the Appellant recognizes that 
error alone without prejudice to the 
Appellant's rights is not sufficient for 
the granting of a new trial, it is submitted 
that the failure to instruct on the element 
of mens rea was prejudicial to the Appellant 
since, but for the absence of an instruction 
on knowledge and intent, and reliance on 
the part of the doctor as essential elements 
of the crime charged, it is not only likely, 
but is probable, in light of the evidence 
before the jury, that the jury could and 
-15-
would have reached a different conclusion 
' and that, consequently, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been 
different. This, of course, is the test 
for determining the prejudicial effect of 
error. Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 
237 P. 2d 834 (1951); Hales vs. Peterson, 
11 Ut. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961); and 
while prejudice is not presumed from extant 
error, Drotleff vs. Renshaw, 208 P. 2d 969 
(Cal. 1949), it seems to be clear that a 
failure to affirmatively instruct the jury 
in a criminal matter with reference to the 
essential and material elements of knowledge 
and int~nt constitutes prejudicial error and 
forms the basis for reversal and remand for 
new trial. People v. Garcia, 337 P. 2d 100 
(Cal., 1959); State vs. Hus Kenson, 226 P. 
2d 779 (Idaho, 1951). 
The total paucity of evidence of what · 
the Appellant knew or intended with reference 
to the obtaining of the narcotic drug can 
lead one to no other conclusion but that the· 
result could have been different, as a matter 
of reasonable likelihood, had the jury been 
properly instructed. On the other hand, the 
testimony which was adduced affirmatively 
supports the proposition that the Appellant 
did not know the character of the drug he 
obtained, and that he did not intend to 
obtain a narcotic drug. Thus, Dr. Spencer 
testified as follows: 
"Q.: And would you relate 
to the jury and to the 
Court, please, where it 
was that you saw him and 
what, if anything, took 
place? 
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A.: He was sitting in my 
off ice and he was there 
complaining that he and 
his family were all ill 
and needed some medication. 
Q.: (By Mr. Lewis) All right. 
And then, what, if anything, 
did you do? 
A.: I gave him a prescription 
for some opium, telling 
him that the entire family 
could use this." (Tr. 24) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer 
continued to testify as follows: 
"Q.: .What was the nature 
of the ailment defendant 
complained of, Doctor? 
A.: He complained that not 
only he, but his family, 
were suffering from diarrhea 
and that they had been out 
of town and that they must 
have gotten something 
either in way of food or 
water that the entire 
family was sick. 
Q.: So as a result of this 
interview you had with 
this person, whoever he 
might be, you issued a 
prescription that we 
marked as State's 
Exhibit A? 
-17-
A.: That's correct." (Tr. 26) 
The only inferences which the jury 
could draw from the foregoing testimony, 
which testimony constitutes the totality 
of the State's evidence regarding the 
~uestion of knowledge and intent, is that 
the Appellant and his family were ill and 
were suffering from a malady for which 
medication was needed; that the doctor had 
a wide choice of medication to recommend 
or prescribe, including everything from 
Kaopectate to Deodorized Tincture of Opium; 
and that without any request on the part of 
the Appellant, the doctor determined to 
prescribe what just happened to be a narcotic 
drug. With the testimony in this posture, 
the jury, if properly instructed, not only 
could, but probably would have found that 
the Appellant did not know that he was 
obtaining a narcotic drug by the use of a 
faJse name, but rather, that he was merely 
a victim of the doctor's independent medical 
decision as to which medication to utilize, · 
which decision was based on diagnosis, and 
not request, or reliance on the false name. 
It is clear, if the doctor had decided to 
recommend Kaopectate as the medication, there 
would have been no crime charged here. It 
would be indeed unfortunate to deprive a 
citizen of five years of his life as a free 
member of society on so slim and fragile an 
evidentiary reed as the State has presented 
as its total case. 
Moreover, the jury had no opportunity 
lo consider the elements of knowledge or 
intent or to give them weight since the 
triaJ court, for all practical purposes, had 
'~'.<cl uded Appellant's knowledge and intent 
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and the doctor's reliance on the use of the 
false name as necessary elements of the 
alleged crime in its Instruction Number 8 
to the jury. The trial court's error is 
clearly prejudicial to the rights of the 
Appellant in this matter since, based on 
the testimony before the jury, its verdict 
would probably have been quite different 
with a proper instruction. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
JURY THAT APPELLANT USED A FALSE 
NAME, THAT FRANK REVERA WAS NOT 
HIS TRUE NAME OR THAT ISADORE 
BLEA WAS HIS TRUE NAME, AND THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY IS THUS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BEFORE 
IT. 
The State did not adduce nor did it 
atb-::r:ipt to adduce any evidence as to the 
f aL:;i ty of the name "Frank Revera" so far 
as this appellant is concerned. Even viewing 
the total testimony in a light most favorable 
to the State, it cannot be said that there is 
the slightest scintilla of evidence upon 
which the jury could have drawn even the 
most remote but legitimate inference that 
"Frank Revera" was not the true name of 
Appellant or that it was, in fact, a false 
name, or that Appellant did not commonly 
use the name "Frank Revera" or that "Isadore 
Blea" was in fact Appellant's true name. 
There is no evidence on this point. 
In any other matter, where the stakes 
are not so high, such a ~ailure to meet one's 
-19-
burden of proof might be dismissed as de 
rninimus. But here, the falsity of the name 
is the very essence of the offense. It goes 
to the most basic policy reasons behind the 
legislative creation of the offense. 
The only item the jury had before 
it which might imply that "Frank Revera" 
was not the Appellant's name is the title 
of the case: "The State of Utah vs. 
Isadore Blea". Appellant earnestly submits 
to this Court that this does not aid nor 
should it be permitted to aid the State in 
carrying its burd~n in proving each of the 
elements of this crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The only way that the jury could reach 
the result it did was to assume something 
that wasn't there, something that it was 
not entitled to assume in light of the 
evidence before it. 
Where "[t]here is not a scintilla of· 
evidence in the record to support either the 
verdict or judgment, • • • this alone 
justified a reversal." Maloy vs. Griffith, 
240 P. 2d 923 (Colo., 1952). Appellant 
urges this Court to reverse and remand for 
a new trial. 
POINT III. 
FAILURE OF APPELLANT AT THE TRIAL 
BELOW TO OBJECT OR EXCEPT TO THE 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM 
NOTICING ERROR AND. REMANDING FOR 
NEW TRIAL. 
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While Appellant recognizes the existence 
of the general rule that in criminal matters, 
as well as in civil matters, failure to take 
exception to the Court's instructions does 
not preserve on appeal those items to which 
exception might have been taken but was not. 
It is submitted, however, that the above rule 
is of general application only and is subject 
to the following exceptions, which pertain 
here. 
Thus, in State vs. Peterson, 121 Utah 
229, 240 P. 2d 504 (1952), this Court stated 
that: 
" • . where instructions are 
palpably erroneous to such an extent 
that they would if, followed by the 
jury, prevent a fair or proper 
determination of the issues, we 
may notice the error without 
exception having been taken." 
To the same effect is this Court's 
holding in State vs. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 
2d 952 (1936) where it was stated at 958 P. 
2d: 
"We recognize the well-settled 
general rule in this and in other 
jurisdictions that alleged errors 
with respect to instructions and 
in refusing requests to instruct 
ordinarily will not on appeal be 
considered or reviewed, unless 
sufficient exceptions thereto were 
taken in the Court below by the 
party agreed. Such rule, however, 
is not uniform as to all errors so 
committed. In many jurisdictions 
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there are well-recognized 
exceptions to the general rule, 
especially in criminal cases 
involving capital offenses or 
other grave and serious offenses 
of long-term imprisonment and 
sometimes has been applied even 
in civil cases where palpable 
error on the face of the record 
involved violations of fundamental 
rights and privileges of manifest 
prejudice to the party agreeing ••• 
In capital cases, the Court may 
take notice of errors apparent 
on the record affecting the sub-
stantial right of the prisoner 
on his trial, although not 
made a ground of appeal 
(citations) 
We do not wish to depart from 
the rule laid down in this juris-
diction that in ordinary cases on 
appeal, errors relating to instruc-
tions or refusing requests to 
instruct will not be considered 
or reviewed unless exceptions 
thereto were properly taken by 
the parties complaining. In 
capital cases and in cases of grave 
and serious charged offenses and 
convictions of long terms of 
imprisonment, cases involving the 
life and liberty of the citizen, 
we think that when palpable error 
is made to appear on the face of 
the record and to the manifest 
prejudice of the accused, the Court 
has the power to notice it there 
and to correct the same, though 
no formal exception was taken to 
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the ruling. In these days of 
widespread advocacy a reformed 
procedure in criminal cases to 
heal and cure misgivings and 
faulty prosecutions the safe-
guards of the rights and privileges 
of the accused should not be over-
looked and a loose reign held for 
the prosecution and a tight, 
technical, ctnd restricted reign 
held on the accused." (Emphasis 
is the Court's) 
Finally, in State vs. Waid, 92 Utah 
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937), the Court stated 
at 309, 92 Ut.: 
"We are most earnestly urged by 
counsel for defendant in their brief 
and oral argument to notice the error 
and correct it, notwithstanding no 
exceptions thereto were taken in 
the Court below by the agreed party. 
Where plain and palpable error 
shows on the face of the record with 
respect to instructions given or 
refused, we have the authority so 
to do. In such a case, the State 
has no right to hold the judgment, 
and we think it is the clear duty 
of the Court to notice the error 
and correct it. (citation) 
The rule has been applied in 
capital cases and in cases of 
grave and serious offenses involv-
ing long terms of imprisonment. 
In the case at hand, the defendant 
was found guilty of but simple 
assault. Counsel urged upon us 
that the charge made against 
defendant was of such a nature 
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that if proved would bring him 
into public contempt and disrepute 
of great compensity. A conviction 
of simple assault under such a 
charge partakes of a nature of a 
graver offense and entails the 
loss of friends and the respect 
of fellows. The error committed 
prevented his having a fair trial. 
We think, therefore, that we 
should notice the error, reverse 
the judgment and remand the cause 
for a new trial ••• " 
The Appellant submits that in the 
present case there is palpable error appearing 
on the face of the record which manifestly 
prejudices the Appellant and prevented his 
having a fair trial on the offense charged, 
a conviction of which offense most certainly 
brings him into public contempt and disrepute 
and entails the loss of friends and the 
respect of fellows. For the foregoing 
reasons, the Appellant urges that this Court· 
notice the error, reverse the judgment and 
remand the cause for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & 
LATIMER 
By 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
